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Editorial
The UN Climate Change Conference (COP15) held in Copenhagen between December 7 and 
19, 2009 was the focus of unprecedented international attention. The COP had the objective 
to reach a legally binding treaty for international climate policy in the period 2013-2020, cover-
ing the elements mitigation, adaptation, ﬁ nance and technology. Moreover, a shared vision for 
long-term collaborative action beyond 2020 was to be deﬁ ned.
The Danish strategy had from the outset focused on securing a legally binding agreement as a 
successor to the Kyoto Protocol by concentrating on the major carbon emitters. The chances 
of securing such a treaty had suffered a blow when it became clear during the course of the 
autumn that the US Congress would be unable to pass a bill on domestic climate policy before 
COP15. The Danish negotiation team then frantically attempted to set up a political agreement 
which could be converted into a legally binding one once US legislation had been passed, 
probably in the ﬁ rst half of 2010. 
The second pillar of the Danish strategy was to get as many emission reduction pledges from 
industrialised and advanced developing countries alike. This was successful – in the two 
weeks immediately preceding COP15, all industrialised countries had announced emission 
targets that amounted to a reduction of 13-19% from 1990 levels by 2020. While not reaching 
the corridor of 25-40% which the IPCC thinks is required to remain on a path that could limit 
global warming to below 2°C, this level was a good basis for negotiations. Even more promis-
ing was the level of mitigation targets from Brazil, China, Indonesia and South Africa, who an-
nounced reductions of 25-40% from business-as-usual levels. While business-as-usual pro-
jections were debatable, with the Chinese target based on emissions intensity and a large part 
of the other targets heavily dependent on reducing deforestation, the targets clearly marked a 
signiﬁ cant deviation from business-as-usual.
The key faultlines at the COP focused on the level of emissions commitments for industrialised 
and advanced developing countries, veriﬁ cation of emissions reductions and policies, as well 
as ﬁ nancing for mitigation and adaptation in developing countries. While the USA, Russia, 
Japan and the EU wanted to scrap the two track structure of the Kyoto Protocol and a Conven-
tion track, all developing countries strongly favoured continuation of the two track procedure. 
Throughout the COP, there was no movement of either industrialised or advanced developing 
countries beyond earlier pledges. A conﬂ ict that broke out at the COP itself was the monitoring 
of the policies and emissions of advanced developing countries. China was unwilling to allow 
external monitoring of its emissions data. Regarding ﬁ nancing, vague statements (“up to 100 
billion”) by the USA and EU were seen as unacceptable by developing countries, particularly 
as Germany had stated that it wanted climate ﬁ nance to be treated as ofﬁ cial development 
assistance. Moreover, the administration of the ﬁ nancing was strongly contested, with indus-
trialised countries favouring World Bank/GEF administration over a UN style fund proposed by 
developing countries. The USA and China clashed visibly. The EU did not manage to play the 
leading role it had always foreseen for itself.
The Danish strategy to get maximum high-level involvement backﬁ red spectacularly. Firstly, it 
generated expectations among the lower-level bureaucrats in the ﬁ rst week of the conference 
that the bigwigs would come to the rescue anyway, resulting in progress at a glacial pace with 
much time wasted by the suspension of meetings. A leaked draft of a Copenhagen agreement re-
inforced the feeling that the formal negotiations were pure show and that the real decisions would 
be made in a small back room. Ministers felt squeezed between the bureaucrats and the heads of 
state, who did not know the subject well and had little time. The handover of the COP presidency 
from the experienced environment minister Connie Hedegaard to Prime Minister Rasmussen was 
symptomatic. Rasmussen turned out to be a burden on the process. He was unable to under-
stand the dangerous dynamics of countries that were left out of the decision-making process. 
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The main problem with his approach was that decisions were announced in press conferences 
instead of being proposed to the formal bodies. Otherwise, the “friends of the chair” process that 
he engaged in was a standard negotiation tactic, with 25 countries and three entities participat-
ing. By 11 p.m. on 18 December, these negotiations had led to a three-page document, the Co-
penhagen Accord; the breakthrough had come out of a negotiation between the heads of state of 
the USA, China, India, Brazil and South Africa. The Accord has the following elements:
General recognition of the scientiﬁ c view that the global temperature increase should be • 
kept below 2°C. However, it includes neither an aggregate emissions target for 2050 nor a 
date for the peaking of global emissions.
Developed and developing countries should list their emission reduction targets by the end • 
of January 2010. There is no aggregate emissions target for industrialised countries.
The status of the Kyoto Protocol’s second commitment period is unclear, as the Accord • 
states that the industrialised country targets “further strengthen the emissions reductions 
initiated by the Kyoto Protocol”.
Only those emission reduction policies by developing countries that are subsidised by • 
industrialised countries will be veriﬁ ed internationally. Reporting frequency is every two 
years.
A $30 billion collective ﬁ nancing commitment by developed countries from 2010 to 2012 • 
(Japan: $11 billion, EU: $10.6 billion, USA: $3.6 billion so far), which will be scaled up to $100 
billion annually by 2020. The funding will come from a variety of sources (public, private, bi-
lateral, multilateral, “alternative”) and be “new and additional”. “Alternative” probably refers 
to the auctioning of emissions allowances proposed by Norway. Developed and develop-
ing countries would have the same share of votes in the body governing adaptation ﬁ nance. 
A Copenhagen Green Climate Fund will be set up which will administer a signiﬁ cant portion 
of the overall funding.
Introduction of a mechanism to prevent deforestation (REDD+) and a “country-driven” • 
technology mechanism, without further speciﬁ cation.
A weak reference to market mechanisms, without any speciﬁ cations. There is a vague ref-• 
erence to incentives for countries that currently have low emissions to “continue to develop 
on a low emission pathway”.
Review of the target levels in 2015, with an extremely convoluted reference to a possible • 
strengthening of the target to keep temperature increases below 1.5°C.
The conversion of the Copenhagen Accord into a legally binding treaty was to be ﬁ nalised by 
the end of 2010. Assuming that the adoption of the Copenhagen Accord by the COP plenary 
was a mere formality, heads of state departed around midnight on Dec. 18. This allowed an 
unprecedented revolt on the morning of Dec. 19, as the Copenhagen Accord was opposed 
by Tuvalu, socialist Latin American states led by Nicaragua and Venezuela, and Sudan in the 
closing plenary and thus could not be adopted due to the consensus requirement in UNFCCC 
negotiations. Through the face saving trick of letting the COP “take note of” the Accord, a 
complete disaster was averted in the last minute.
The Accord can be revived if many countries sign up, and it can be bolstered by concrete 
UNFCCC decisions. This requires the US Congress to enact the cap and trade bill. A global 
agreement with a global carbon currency is thus still within reach, but the window of oppor-
tunity is closing rapidly. Alternatively, the debate over whether the UN is the right forum for 
climate negotiations will intensify, and negotiations might shift to the G20. But it is even more 
likely that several unilateral pledges with distinct offset systems will emerge. Such a fragment-
ed climate policy environment would not be able to address the challenge of accelerating cli-
mate change impact, and we might lose a crucial decade in our ﬁ ght against climate change.
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